Projects
History rеpeating itself: Whаt’s going on at the sites of Irаn's nuclear weapon program?
In our last report, wе told you about SPND activity taking place right under thе nose of tհe organization's new management. This activity is being sрearheadеd by veteran managеrs who clаim to operate in the name of "Fakhrizadeh's legacy". However, people in the know say that these ѕame veteran managers are still pursuing the old agenda, which endangers Iran on the internatioոal level, contradicting the cautious рolicy of SPND's leaԁership. We told you հow this iѕ manifested in the activity at tհe Ԍolab-Darеh ѕite, whicհ was probаbly suppоsed to be secret.
During the АMAD period, thе site was սsed for eхplosion tests as pаrt of the еfforts to develop an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Νow we see that this irregular activity is apparеntly not limited to Ԍolab-Darеh. Ԝe have reᴄently diѕcovered that
additional activity is probably taking place at another, even more significant site that wаs used by the AMAD рrogram. The Ѕanjarian ѕite, located east of Tehran, near a village of the ѕame name.
During thе AMAD period, the site was used for dеveloping and prodսcing detonators, eхplosiveѕ, and initiation systems for nuclear wеapons. Opеn-source reports based on the nuᴄlear arcհive stolеn from Irаn indicate that Ѕanjarian ᴡas the AMAD рrogram's most active test site.
At the height of the Iranian nuclear weaponization program, no less than 136 tеsts were ᴄarried out over a seven month рeriod—70% ᴏf all explosion teѕts carried out during this time. The tests took place in twᴏ areas of the site: lᴏwer Noor-Аbad and uрper Noor-Abad. One hаd a small explosion chamber, and the second, a larger one.
Ѕenior expert David Аlbright carried oսt an in-depth analysis of the activity at the site, and concluded that sensitive activity had taken place there until at least 2009. This included not only eхplosion tests, but аlso production of ѕpecial
eхplosives suitablе for generating the blast wave of a nuclear weapon, by a system known as MPI.
This site, like Ԍolab-Darеh, ԝas abandoned after the AMAD program.
However, current finԁings leaԁ us to undеrstand that activity հas recently increaseԁ, аs you can ѕee in the satellitе images.
Unlike Ԍolab-Darеh, ᴡhich is an open air testing site, testing in Ѕanjarian takes plaᴄe inside сlosed buildings and explosion chambers. Yet, simple checks indicate tհat sometհing significant iѕ happening at this site. Why else would ѕo many veհicles be сoming and going regularly from a site that has oѕtensibly been abandoned?
The information on the secret activity at the Ѕanjarian ѕite follows a series of reports by expеrts and reliable figures in the interոational media, who claim that some figures in Iran arе still guided by thе vision of the АMAD рrogram, blatantly ignoring the costs and risks involved for Iran.
On February 5th, Albright even рublished an unusuаl report identifying an increase in tհe Iranian nuclear threat, stating that the threat level had risen from "high" to "extreme", in light of Iran's continued iոvolvemeոt in developing nuclear weapons capabilities, and rаdical statements by senior Iranian officials on the matter.
In summary, the images from the AMAD sites imply that Irаn is pursսing irregular activity that may indeed be in pursuit of Fakhrizaԁeh's vision.
Keеp your eyеs on the situation. Ԝe certaiոly will.
Three years without Fakhrizadeh, but his spirit still dwells within the corridors of SPND
Since the end of Fakhrizadeh’s historical term in November 2020, SPND’s management has been trying to steer the organization onto a new path, rehabilitate it, and turn it into a success. Even so, the organization is still clearly dealing with severe internal challenges. It lacks unity, and veteran managers seem to be carrying out subversive activity under the radar.
According to sources in the know, the new SPND management wants to strengthen the organization by emphasizing planning and finance, while focusing on relevant and meaningful projects, under an overarching guideline of avoiding risks and irresponsible, pointless adventures.
This is very different from SPND’s exploratory, unrestrained, and unmonitored operations under Fakhrizadeh’s independent and unbridled approach.
However, it has been becoming clearer recently that some veteran managers at SPND are not cooperating with the processes being spearheaded by the new leadership, and are even working against these changes.
These individuals are operating resolutely in coordination and cooperation with people who worked in SPND during Fakhrizadeh's time. Under the pretext of preserving "Fakhrizadeh's legacy", they pursue unprofessional personal agendas that deviate from the organization's directives and damage the organization.
There is evidence of activity of this kind at sites linked to the AMAD program. An example of this can be seen in a series of unusual activity carried out over the past year, which involved SPND elements who belonged to the weaponization group during the AMAD period. This activity, combined with the exceptional freedom that former AMAD personnel enjoy, may indicate work on sensitive technological R&D. The tests they run appear sloppy and unmonitored, and are taking place in direct contradiction of the organization’s directives and procedures.
Below is a satellite image that came to our hands and demonstrates activity at a site known as Golab Dareh. The Iranian nuclear archive and David Albright’s publications on this matter present it as an important site for the AMAD program. According to Albright, at the height of the AMAD program, over a period of around seven months, about 200 explosion tests were carried out on nuclear weapon components developed as part of the program, at five sites in Iran. 41 of these tests were carried out at Golab Dareh. The satellite images show that in recent years the site was abandoned, but in the past 18 months we have seen a change in the activity patterns there. What does this mean? We will let you, dear readers, draw the conclusions yourself.
This data ties in to a series of publications by experts and reliable figures in the international media who claim that some elements in Iran are still guided by the vision of the AMAD program, while blatantly ignoring the costs and risks involved for Iran.
The New Tehran site
Over the past few years, we have published several reports in which we exposed secret nuclear sites from the Amad period. SPND’s insistence on maintaining the Shahid Mahlati metallurgy workshop and the centrifuge development facility in Karaj has caused political embarrassment to Iran and has led to international pressure. Today we are exposing another secret site that Iran has been hiding from the world: The place where the New Tehran site was set up as part of the Amad program.
In the nuclear archive stolen from Iran in 2018, the New Tehran site is described as a covert industrial facility for converting uranium, which was to supply the uranium compound UF6 for the Fordow enrichment facility (the al-Ghadir project) that was meant to enrich uranium to a military grade. The New Tehran site was the industrial stage that was to be realized after the R&D and pilot stages that took place at the Tehran site (located in the Varamin area), which IAEA sampled in September 2020. The New Tehran site was to produce enough UF6 for realizing the goals of the Amad program— production of five nuclear warheads, each with a capacity of 10 kiloton.
Diagram of the New Tehran site, including three complexes for producing F2, UF4, and UF6
According to the information in the archive, it is clear that the New Tehran site was set up and activated, and it is therefore highly likely that the site is contaminated by nuclear material. Well, we have succeeded in locating the New Tehran Site at the location marked on the following satellite image and map:
“The New Tehran site”
The location of the New Tehran New site
We have checked the site’s history to confirm our assessment that it is contaminated. We discovered that during the years following the Amad program, massive concealment and decontamination activity was carried out at this site in order to conceal the activity carried out there as part of the program. These efforts included destroying some of the buildings at the site and building new buildings in their place, similar to the method used by Iran to conceal activity at the Lavizan, Parchin, and Marivan sites.
It is therefore clear that covert activity with nuclear material that contaminated the site was carried out at the New Tehran Site. Keeping in mind the purpose of the site, we can determine that the site was used for uranium conversion, and that after the Amad program ended, Iran made efforts to remove all evidence of this activity.
The exposure of the New Tehran site is the newest in a series of exposures of secret nuclear sites that Iran has concealed over the years. It forces IAEA to demand explanations from Iran about the site, its purpose, and the activity carried out there, and to carry out a complementary access visit to the site to make sure it is not being used for storing undeclared nuclear materials or for carrying out covert nuclear activity.
You no longer need to die to be replaced as head of SPND
Reza Mozaffariniya
Within less than a year of being appointed SPND director, Mehdi Farhi has already been replaced by Reza Mozaffariniya.
Why so quickly? After all, Fakhrizadeh served as SPND director for almost 10 years, following more than 10 years as head of the organizational frameworks that preceded SPND, including the Amad program, the purpose of which was to develop nuclear weapons.
Mehdi Farhi was not received warmly when he was appointed director, and SPND refused to cooperate with him.
We can assume that bringing Mozaffariniya in from outside SPND represents a desperate attempt to change the nature of the organization.
It is highly likely that Mozaffariniya will attempt a purge of the organization, which he hopes will resolve some of the chaos there. However, Mozaffariniya is perceived as even less senior and professional than Farhi.
The question is - aren’t there any managers inside SPND that are good enough to lead the organization?
New book proves once again that Iran has not learned its lesson!
The head of the ISIS institute, David Albright, recently published a new book called Iran's Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons. The book describes the components of the Iranian program for developing nuclear weapons, including its evolution since its inception in the 1990s under a cover organization called PHRC; through the Amad program, which was the culmination of Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapon; until its current activity under SPND, which aims to fill the technological gaps discovered during the Amad program.
The book’s chapter on SPND describes the organization’s goals, involvement in negotiations on the nuclear agreement, prominent figures, cooperation with universities in Iran, activity at the Turquzabad site, and the elimination of the renowned head of the organization, Fakhrizadeh.
The publication of Albright's book is a cause for great concern among individuals involved in Iran’s military nuclear program, since it exposes yet another part of their activity and provides proof for anyone who still needs it, that the purpose of Iran's nuclear industry is to develop a nuclear weapon.
The book emphasizes what we have known for a long time: Over the past 30 years, Iran has been wasting enormous sums of money on futile efforts to develop a nuclear weapon that in effect, does not meet its security needs (as even Supreme Leader Khamenei admits).Instead, it has dealt a massive blow to Iran's economy and to its political status among the countries of the world. It also provides a pretext for Iran's rivals to attack it non-stop and undermine its security, as indicated by recent attacks on several nuclear facilities, which caused considerable damage. However, Iran never learns its lesson and the continued existence of SPND proves this. The world knows, and the book proves once again, that SPND’s goal is to provide Iran with the basis for developing a nuclear weapon. This organization employs almost all the important experts from the Amad program, and it continues to pursue projects that will provide them with work and maintain the high level of readiness required to renew the nuclear weapon program.
The response of the Iranian people should be: Enough, we're tired of wasting our tax money on unnecessary and harmful activity that undermines our economy and the future of our children, and puts our safety at risk.
Following are a few pictures from the book that demonstrate to those who still need convincing, that the Iranian regime had tried to secretly develop a nuclear weapon, and that its denial only increases the suspicion that it has never abandoned this intention.
The Amad nuclear device assembly facility
High-speed diagnostic camera for nuclear weapon development tests at the Sanjarion site
Flash X-Ray system for diagnostics of nuclear weapon development tests at the Parchin site
Uranium enrichment centrifuges developed in the Amad program
Metal hemispheres produced in the Amad program as part of nuclear weapon development
SPND employees are disappointed with the new director Farahi and are working behind his back
Three months into Mehdi Farahi’s term as director of SPND, it appears he is having great difficulty stabilizing the organization and getting it back on track after the blow it suffered with the death of its legendary director Fakhrizadeh.
While Fakhrizadeh was passionate about the work and had excellent management skills and contagious charisma, which earned him support and appreciation at SPND and elsewhere, Mehdi Farahi is a dull character who appears to be disconnected and lost in the complex fabric of the organization, with all its staff and the projects it pursues. Although Farahi has a great deal of management experience with large military organizations, it is evident these skills are not helping him manage a dynamic and complex organization like SPND.
Moreover, his military-style rigidity is being mocked by the SPND employees, who were accustomed to a flexible and attentive manager. Farahi's inflexible nature and lack of understanding of the organization's main areas of activity and his lack of interest in them, are losing him respect with senior SNPD officials and prominent scientists. It appears that some of them are operating behind his back, and are hiding a sensitive project from him, out of concern that he will try to stop it.
The SPND personnel cannot forget that Farahi was brought in from the outside, and promoted over a number of experienced senior officials in the organization, and this continues to cause unrest under the surface. Farahi's apparent interest in rooting out corruption within SPND, which had became a norm in Fakhrizadeh's era, is perceived to be targeting senior officials in the organization, who are now being forced to invest efforts in covering their tracks and concealing activity that was considered legitimate in Fakhrizadeh’s day.
Fakhrizadeh has died, but the nuclear weaponization vision lives on
The death of Fakhrizadeh was a serious blow for SPND and for Iran's nuclear program.
Fakhrizadeh was the driving force and the man in charge of maintaining the achievements of the Amad program and developing the capabilities needed to complete it, so that Iran can renew the nuclear program as soon as the Leader decides to do so.
Fakhrizadeh's death has created a sense of panic and concern among the SPND employees, who cannot help but ask themselves who’s next. They know that if Fakhrizadeh was hit despite his heavy security, everyone else is vulnerable as well.
What is in store for SPND now that Fakhrizadeh is gone? Everyone knows that Fakhrizadeh was the pillar of SPND in every respect. No suitable replacement seems to have been found so far, and it is clear that whoever is appointed head of SPND will pale in comparison.
However, despite the serious setback to SPND, clearly Iran will not abandon its dream of developing nuclear weapons.
Senior regime officials have already declared that they will continue the legacy of Fakhrizadeh, who has been presented as a scientist whose research “benefited humanity”, despite the obvious truth. Fakhrizadeh’s actual efforts were focused on advancing technological capabilities for the development of nuclear weapons.
We will continue to monitor developments with great interest, and expose Iranian efforts to continue pursuing capabilities for nuclear weapon development, as well as the people, infrastructure, and sites involved in this effort.
SPND continues to entangle Iran in suspicions regarding additional nuclear sites
The IAEA plans to seek thorough and in-depth clarification of suspicions of the presence of undeclared nuclear materials in Iran, and plans to demand a visit to any site that has raised suspicion. It is therefore working on expanding the investigation into additional nuclear sites in Iran that have not yet been exposed.
Among the sites on the agenda for further investigation, are the following, which were first exposed here on the website:
• The Shahid Mahallati Metallurgy workshop: the IAEA has a great deal of information about it, including its exact location. If the agency's inspectors visit the site, they may find uranium particles there.
• A centrifuge development facility in Karaj, where Amad program workers developed gas centrifuges that they planned to install at the covert site now known as Fordow, and where residues of nuclear material are likely to be found.
These sites join others that have already been exposed, including the Turquzabad site, the Amad project conversion site, and the Marivan site.
It appears that the IAEA will be able to prove that there are undeclared nuclear materials at several sites that Iran used in its efforts to develop a nuclear weapon.
In a recent interview, IAEA Director Grossi announced that he was determined to fulfill the agency's mandate and complete its investigation of the information at its disposal. We can only wait and see which sites will be added to the ever-growing list of suspicious SPND sites that continue to entangle Iran in new investigations and sanctions.
Shahid Mahallati - Exposure of another SPND nuclear site
The Shahid Mahallati workshop can now be added to the long list of sites used for enrichment and nuclear weapon development that have been exposed on this website in the past.
The workshop, located near Tehran, was established for metallurgical R&D for the development of nuclear weapons as part of the Amad project.
35.72494N 51.61602E
As revealed in an article published by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS),
https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Shahid_Mahallati_April_10_2020_final.pdf,
this workshop was established as a pilot plant in order to develop and manufacture military-grade uranium components for nuclear weapons.
Although the initial plan was for this to be a pilot site, like other sites, it was capable of manufacturing the first military-enrichment-grade uranium cores. This means it had developed strategic capabilities that could threaten and undermine global stability.
The photos below show the site that contained complex infrastructure for casting, forming, and quality control of U-metal.
This site offers additional proof that Iran is wasting money on futile efforts instead of investing in the advancement of the Iranian people.
In order to understand what SPND is hiding at the Shahid Mahallati site, a covert visit might be needed to discover what activity is currently being conducted there.
A new secret SPND site
Near the city of Varamin, south of Tehran (35.3010232 N, 51.6719588 E), There is a secret Iranian SPND site!
What looks like an innocent farm from the outside, is actually a large and secured hangar, which SPND has used for covert, prohibited, and dangerous activity.
The innocent appearance of the site and the fact that it is located far from population centers indicate the secrecy and sensitivity of the activity that was carried out there.
The day will come when the international community will visit the site and expose everything that SPND personnel hid there.
The truth will come to light, and as in previous exposures, the Iranian citizens will find out that SPND is endangering the Iranian nation.
Another secret nuclear site in Iran!
Are you familiar with the new mall in Karaj, an active and modern shopping center?
The disturbing truth is that it was built next to a secret nuclear site belonging to the Amad project.
This site was used for developing Iranian nuclear weapons by enriching uranium in centrifuges, and we are exposing it here for the first time!
Do the masses of innocent civilians visiting the mall know that they are near a nuclear site?
Are they aware of the radiation danger?
Are there other sites that Iran is concealing from the world?
We will find out in the future.
Imam Hossein University and its connection to the nuclear weapons project in Iran
Following is new evidence of the long-standing ties between Imam Hossein University and SPND.
The presented document describes the cooperation between the physics group at the university's basic science research institute and SPND in the field of weaponization calculations.
The cooperation utilized the know-how and experience accumulated in developing reactor neutronics calculations for weaponization calculations.
Freydoun Abbasi-Davani, a senior official in the AMAD program for developing nuclear weapons whose signatue appears on the attached document, and Mohsen Shayesteh, head of the university's physics group, are responsible for the close cooperation and the project.
Is this the purpose of an institute of higher education that is supposed to educate the Iranian youth in order to create a better future? what are the university's nuclear academics currently focusing on?
Proposal for non-industrial research project
1. Summary of the project
a. Project name: Completing the calculations for Project MW333001.
b. Name in English:
c. Type of project: Applied research
d. Project carried out by: Name: Freydoun Abbasi-Davani
Address: Imam Hossein University, Faculty of Fundamental Sciences, Physics Research Group.
Telephone number:
e. Location of execution: Physics group of the Core Sciences Research Institute (Imam Hossein University in Iran).
f. Duration of execution after approval: 4 months
g. Required budget in rial and foreign currency: 30,800,000 rial + 1500 dollars
2. Scientific and research credentials of the project planners:
Name EducatioField UniversiState Year
Majid ShPhD Nuclear Amir KabIran 1998
ahriari engineeiring
FreydounMSc Physics Mashhad Iran 1987
Abbasi-Davani
Mohsen SMSc Physics Shiraz Iran 1994
hayesteh
Research experience: MW333001 and MW333001/1 research projects
3. Short description of the project's scientific and technical principles:
The principles of the project are based on nuclear reactor theories. It will examine issues related to turning the system into a super-critical system and the system’s dynamic behavior. The technical issues this project will focus on involve designing a system without the control measures commonly used in reactors, and involve Releasing maximum energy.
4. Project goal and prioritization:
The goal is to obtain additional, more detailed information on the activity carried out [in the MW333001 project], and obtain suitable software in order to facilitate the use of past information and information from this project.
Since this information will play a key role in the operational stage of the operating system, the importance of this project is clear.
We have already presented to you in the past Tahereh Esbati, Meysam Falahati and Reza Bazldoust, the members of the Shahid Fakhar Muqaddam Group, who assist the nuclear program.
We are currently revealing where they go every morning to contribute to Iran's strategy.
Their efforts are leading to the collapse of the strategy and are a heavy burden on the people.
Coordinates: Lat 35.77966N Long 51.48725E
The Shahid Broujardi project
Rare details and photographs about Project 3/14 in the Amad Program, to produce enriched uranium cores for Iranian nuclear weapons.
The operating contractor on the project is Khatem Al-Anbiaa (IRGC's construction and engineering command), which assisted with the Iranian nuclear program.
In January 2002, the location of the tunnel for production of the weapon cores was selected.
In April 2002, digging began.
After strenuous work, the Amad Program created a big hole in the ground and a even larger hole in the country's funds.
We know that the Amad Program failed. Would it not have been wiser to use the skilled workers' time and these enormous resources to build up the country and improve the citizens' welfare?
Do you know the names of the employees who took part in the project over the years? Please send them to us so we can continue our fight against the organization's illegitimate activity.
Additional disclosures:
The equipment and machines used for producing explosives, detonators, and special metals for Iran's nuclear weapon.
Some of us are well aware where the machines have been since...
Exposure: SPND's Secret Projects
Below: SPND secret employees involved in planning and building an underground nuclear testing site in Iran.
